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 "The Sacred Rights of the Weak":
 Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture
 of Individual Rights
 in Antebellum America
 Elizabeth B. Clark
 In 1835 an antislavery sympathizer leaving a lecture by Theodore Dwight Weld
 went home to dream that she was transported above the world; looking down at
 the United States, she saw "multitudes of sable figures, bending beneath a scorching
 sun - their backs lacerated by the whip - scourged, maimed, loaded with irons -
 subject to every insult -and exposed to every gust of unbridled passions."1 The
 dreamer, a Mrs. Sturges, drew from many discourses in describing her lengthy
 dream, but the fundamental trope of her visionary narrative was the story of the
 suffering slave, a trope that in the 1830s began to play a crucial role in an unfolding
 language of individual rights.
 Slaves had suffered for many generations by the time Mrs. Sturges had her vision,
 but in the 1830s their stories became newly audible and visible in the North, where
 graphic portrayals of slaves' subjective experience of physical pain emerged as common
 antislavery fare. Augmented in the 1840s and 1850s by slave narratives and senti-
 mental fiction, this genre, with its critique of interpersonal violence and sexual
 abuse, served as a vehicle for new arguments for a "right" to bodily integrity. Only
 by understanding changing cultural and religious conceptions of the nature of pain,
 the value of suffering, and the duty of compassion can we understand how, by the
 later nineteenth century, legal standards came to incorporate (albeit imperfectly)
 the idea that to be free of physical coercion and deliberately inflicted pain was an
 essential human right.
 Cruelty was not a novel concept in the nineteenth century, but antislavery writing
 helped expand the definition of cruel behavior. For, despite the constitutional ban
 Elizabeth B. Clark is an associate professor at Boston University Law School and the author of Women, Church,
 and State: Religion and the Culture of Individual Rights in Nineteenth-Century America, forthcoming from
 University of North Carolina Press. This paper has benefitted greatly from discussions with colleagues too numerous
 to mention and from invaluable help from Boston University's Pappas Law Library and the Boston Athenaeum Library.
 1 Robert H. Abzug, Passionate Liberator: Theodore Dwight Weld and the Dilemma of Reform (New York,
 1980), 130.
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 on "cruel and unusual punishment" by the state laid down by the Founders, no
 similar norm or legal check prevailed within such status relationships as those of
 master and slave or husband and wife. Relying on such hierarchical relationships
 to maintain social order in the absence of a standing police force, the legal system
 largely protected the meting out of brutal assault under the cloak of "discipline."
 Delegitimizing the "right" to private violence against persons became an abolitionist
 goal, and the movement fostered a popular rights consciousness that ultimately
 helped to establish protections at law for the persons of freed slaves and, later, of
 wives and to narrow the class of relationships in which violence was sanctioned.2
 Recent historiography has debated the role of capitalism in the formation of
 humane values. But in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was Protestant
 ministers, not merchants, who preached the value of "an interest in the sufferings
 of others who are at a distance from us. . . . [an effort] to extend our sympathies
 beyond 'the little limits of our own State and neighborhood."' A closer look at the
 immediate religious and cultural contexts of American antislavery might reveal
 what David Brion Davis calls "mediating structures or institutions between abstract
 market forces and individual cognition. " Shifting our view to these mediating figures
 and forces would also help explain the periodicity of humane movements in America.
 While Thomas Haskell dates the advent of market capitalism from 1750, antislavery
 sentiment did not rise consistently from 1750 on. Rather, after a brief swell of
 protest in the late 1700s, confined largely to communities of Friends, the movement
 became quiescent until the early 1830s. By 1830 the trend toward market capitalism
 had long been in motion, but only in the thirty years before the Civil War did
 reformers mount an aggressive and highly public assault on violence as a tool of
 governance in the master-slave relationship.3
 This article traces the story of the suffering slave in the antebellum United States
 as emblematic of a shift in moral convention by looking first at the range of uses
 made of that story; then by providing a context for it in changing notions about
 pain derived from liberal Protestant thought and in new imperatives for sympathy
 made popular by evangelical revivalism; and finally by examining how anecdotes
 of brutality helped foster arguments for the rights of the person in the context of
 relationships of authority and dependence.
 Conjoining liberal and evangelical teachings for this analysis verges on egregious
 lumping. Certainly, such "liberal" denominations as the Society of Friends and the
 2 For the persistence in America of a lay rights consciousness, see Hendrik Hartog, "The Constitution of
 Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us All,"' Journal of American History, 74 (Dec. 1987), 1013-34.
 3 James Freeman Clarke, A Sermon Delivered in Amory Hall, on Thanksgiving Day, November 24, 1842
 (Boston, 1843), 4; David Brion Davis, "The Perils of Doing History by Ahistorical Abstraction," in The Antislavery
 Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley,
 1992), 290-309, esp. 290; Thomas L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part
 2," ibid., 136-60; James D. Essig, The Bonds of Wickedness: American Evangelicals against Slavery, 1770-1808
 (Philadelphia, 1982); Richard Brodhead, Cultures ofLetters: Scenes ofReading and Writing in Nineteenth-Century
 America (Chicago, 1993), 13-14.
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 Unitarians openly challenged orthodox Reformed theology. But American Protes-
 tantism across the board was undergoing liberalization as the Calvinist tide ebbed,
 allowing the creation of a mainstream Protestant culture broadly receptive to certain
 Christian humanist ideals.4
 Similarly, the abolitionists whose rhetoric this paper explores had feet in many
 different religious camps; but theological categories, while significant, are not water-
 tight, nor do they comprehensively describe the world view of any given abolitionist.
 Historians have rightly stressed the substantive and strategic quarrels that split the
 antislavery movement along lines sometimes labeled "liberal" and "evangelical."
 But abolitionists also shared a core belief that the whipping of slaves by masters
 represented an indefensible exercise of arbitrary authority and that representations of
 such events should provoke a sympathetic response from right-thinking Christians.
 Protestant teachings that we would label both "liberal" and "evangelical" contrib-
 uted to that belief.5
 Recounting the Suffering of Slaves, 1830-1860
 In the 1830s, the first decade of insurgent abolitionism, the gruesome tribulations
 of the body became a staple of antislavery literature.6 Indeed, abolitionists must
 have thought this genre important to employ it as often as they did: speeches,
 letters, flyers, tracts, minutes, and proceedings from the 1830s and 1840s are filled
 with examples, from brief descriptions to lengthy accounts of "the beatings, the
 brandings, the iron yokes, the croppings, the mutilations, the hunger, want, and
 nakedness." Northern readers of antislavery literature could hardly avoid the tales,
 carefully selected to appall their sensibilities, of the mistress who beat her cook's
 head in with the fire shovel because dinner was burned or the master who had an
 elderly woman - the nanny of his youth - brutally whipped. Another commonly
 told story was of a nephew of Thomas Jefferson, who one evening took a sulky
 slave and, working up from the feet, cropped off small bits and fed them to the
 fire; by morning the carcass was consumed.7
 I D. H. Meyer, The Instructed Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic (Philadelphia, 1972),
 25-26; Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York, 1978), 143-96.
 5 Staughton Lynd, Intellectual Origins ofAmerican Radicalism (New York, 1968), 139-40. On the important
 commonalities among abolitionists, see Ronald G. Walters, The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism after
 1830 (Baltimore, 1976). For religious characterizations of abolitionists, see, for example, Lawrence J. Friedman,
 Gregarious Saints: Selfand Community in American Abolitionism, 1830-1870 (New York, 1982); Bertram Wyatt-
 Brown, Lewis Tappan and the Evangelical War against Slavery (Cleveland, 1969); Abzug, Passionate Liberator;
 and Robert H. Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination (New York, 1994),
 127-62.
 6 Earlier works prefigured this approach: see Jesse Torrey, Portraiture of Domestic Slavery in the United States
 (Philadelphia, 1817); and [David Walker], Walker's Appeal (Boston, 1829). Colonization societies also dwelled
 on physical cruelty to slaves: see SamuelJ. May, Some Recollections of OurAntislavery Conflict (1869; New York,
 1968), 74.
 7 Liberty Bell (Boston, 1844), 5; Lydia Maria Child, Authentic Anecdotes ofAmerican Slavery (Newburyport,
 Mass., 1838), 12; David L. Child, The Despotism ofFreedom; or, The Tyranny and Cruelty ofAmerican Republican
 Slave-Masters, Shown To Be the Worst in the World (Boston, 1833), 28, 42; John Rankin, Letters On American
 Slavery (1837; Westport, 1970), 62-64.
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 Instumsents of slave "discipline," from Lydi Mafia Cid, Ax Appeal in Favor
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 Courtesy Boston Athenaeum.
 Two of the most influential antislavery works of the 1830s were classics of hx'
 genre. Lydia Maria Child's An Appeal In Favor of That Class of Americans Cdllsi
 Africns, published in 183 3, was the frtmajor antislavery tract whose stated mission
 was to "follow the poor slave through his wretched wanderings, in order to give
 some idea of his physical suffering, his mental and moral degradation." Six yews
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 later, Weld, unable to ignore the physical mark left on the body by arbitrary power,
 undertook to collect and authenticate reports of abuse from across the South. Working
 with Sarah and Angelina Grimke, he compiled a catalog of atrocities, American
 Slavery As ItIs, which remained the best-selling antislavery tract from its publication
 in 1839 until the appearance of Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852. The two works inaugu-
 rated a series of pamphlets and books with such telltale titles as Scenes ofOppression
 in the Refined Circles of the South and Picture of Slavery in the United States
 of America, tracts that gained great popularity with their intended audience of
 white northerners.8
 To combat skeptics' dismissal of American Slavery As It Is, Weld sought to
 establish his narratives through scrupulous standards of proof. The importance of
 firsthand testimony was twofold: it avoided hearsay and fulfilled the evangelical
 desire to hear of things close to the heart. In the evangelical framework, the measure
 of authenticity lay in the feelings, not the intellect; the most striking oral and
 written testimony was the eyewitness account, which put the reader as close as
 possible to the slave's pain. As Robert Abzug suggests, through such testimony,
 audiences could "witness the sin of slavery as it acted in men's consciences; they
 could watch the process by which heartfelt recognition of sin would . .. emancipate
 both master and slave." Those following in Weld's footsteps bravely proclaimed
 the fidelity of their material; it was a high point in any meeting when, for example,
 in discussing a slave reputedly crippled when she fell from a window as she was
 trying to escape a master's beating, a member could contribute that he had seen
 the woman in question, and that one of her arms was noticeably crooked.9
 Cruelty narratives did not stake out the moral high ground, and many abolitionists
 preferred to argue that slavery was a matter, not of treatment, but of principle.
 But the stories' very offensiveness was riveting, and they proved to be among the
 most effective and dramatic weapons in the reform arsenal: speakers often righ-
 teously denied any intention to "harrow up" an audience's feelings before going
 on to dwell enthusiastically on atrocities.10 Weld and the Grimkes among others
 realized that sensationalism was effective: in compiling American Slavery As It Is,
 they sent out a long circular asking for information on "PUNISHMENTS -please
 8 Lydia Maria Child, An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Americans Called Africans (Boston, 1833), 6;
 Theodore Dwight Weld, American Slavery As It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses (1839; New York, 1968);
 Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, The Antislavery Impulse, 1830-1844 (1933; Gloucester, Mass., 1957), 264n20, 276n5,
 73; Mrs. M. B. Davis, Scenes of Oppression in the Refined Circles of the South, Addressed to the Women of
 Illinois (Peoria, 1846); George Bourne, Picture of Slavery in the United States of America (1834; Detroit, 1972).
 Lydia Maria Child's Appeal actually mixed several genres of argument; seeJean Fagan Yellin, Women and Sisters:
 The Antislavery Feminists in American Culture (New Haven, 1989), 54-55.
 9 Abzug, Passionate Liberator, 90; Proceedings ofthe New-EnglandAnti-Slavery Convention ... 1834 (Boston,
 1834), 26. During an incredulous discussion of Eliza's escape across the ice floes in Uncle Tom's Cabin, a man
 at an 1852 convention piped up, "It is true; I knew the man who helped her out of the river." The Annual Report
 of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society . . . 1852 (New York, 1852), 27.
 1o Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women ... 1837 (New York, 1837), 7; Abzug,
 Passionate Liberator, 132-35. After such a disclaimer, a New Hampshire convention devoted the next fifteen
 pages to atrocities; Proceedings of the N.H. Anti-Slavery Convention Held in Concord. . . 1834 (Concord, 1834),
 16-30.
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 describe in detail the different modes, postures, instruments and forms of torture.
 . . . Facts and testimonies are troops, weapons and victory, all in one." Some, like
 Theodore Parker, took as a matter of principle that disdain for the slave's person
 and physical sufferings impeded the recognition of his humanity, and they insisted
 that, far from being incidental to the system, cruelty was its bone and sinew: "The
 relation of master and slave begins in violence; it must be sustained by violence - the
 systematic violence of general laws, or the irregular violence of individual caprice."1
 Tales of abuse remained an effective hook for the public right up until the
 Civil War. Five Hundred Thousand Strokes for Freedom, for example, published
 in London in 1853 using many American sources, is a compilation of over eighty
 tracts "calculated to increase a feeling of sympathy for that [enslaved] portion of
 suffering humanity. " They bore such titles as Slave Branding, Murder of an Infant,
 and Hunting Slaves with Blood Hounds."2
 After 1840 the trope of the suffering slave emerged in a new genre, autobiograph-
 ical accounts by freed or escaped slaves. The 1840s was a decade of growing interna-
 tional acclaim for slave narratives. The best known went through many editions
 in the northern United States and in Europe: Moses Roper's account went to ten
 editions and was translated into Celtic, and over one hundred thousand copies of
 Josiah Henson's story were sold. Such demand created a market in which "almost
 any victim of slavery could get published," and by the end of the Civil War over
 one hundred ex-slaves had. Abolitionists, often involved as scribes, agents, editors,
 or distributors of the slave accounts, understood the value of these accounts from
 their days on the lecture circuit, where the firsthand testimony of former slaves
 about their lives in the South had proven the biggest draw. 13
 William Andrews suggests that most practitioners of the slave narrative in its
 classic form, who wrote between 1840 and 1860, set out to portray slavery as a
 brutalizing institution designed to annihilate the slave's very self. The trickster was
 largely absent from these stories, in which slaves were reduced to helpless objects
 of cruelty and exploitation. All made the point, openly or tacitly, that cruelty was
 inherent in the system of slavery. While each account differed in its own obscene
 particulars, there were formulaic scenes: the whipping or mutilation of family mem-
 bers and of the narrator; the auction block where slaves had to perform to demon-
 strate their value and where they were separated from other members of their
 families, most for the last time; and the transportation of slaves in coffles, or chain
 gangs. Frederick Douglass's famous narrative establishes the slave system as one of
 " Gilbert H. Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond, eds., Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina Grimke Weld,
 and Sarah Grimke, 1822-1844 (2 vols., New York, 1934), II, 809. For Theodore Parker's statement, see Lynd,
 Intellectual Origins, 139. See also Abolitionist, 1 (no. 5, 1833), 69; and American Anti-Slavery Almanac, 1 (no.
 2, 1837), 33-34.
 12 A second printing of this compilation was issued after the first one-half million copies sold out. Wilson
 Armistead, ed., Five Hundred Thousand Strokes for Freedom (1853; Miami, 1969), esp. "Preface," [p. 3].
 13 Charles H. Nichols, Many Thousand Gone: The Ex-Slaves'Account of TheirBondage andFreedom (Leiden,
 Netherlands, 1963), xi-xvi, esp. xiv; Barnes and Dumond, eds., Letters of Weld, Grimke, and Grimke, II, 811;
 James B. Stewart, Holy Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery (New York, 1976), 137-38.
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 Flogging staked slaves, from Henry Bibb, Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry
 Bibb, An American Slave, Written by Himself (New York, 1849), 132.
 Courtesy Boston Athenaeum.
 unremitting savagery; one short chapter includes four unprovoked murders. Others,
 for example, John Brown, described practices such as "bucking," during which
 slaves were flogged until bloody and then washed with a mixture of salt, red pepper,
 and water. By midcentury, slave narrators competed with each other to produce
 ever more sensational effects, using such titles as Life and Narrative of William J.
 Anderson, Twenty-Four Years a Slave; Sold Eight Times! In Jail Sixty Times! Whipped
 Three Hundred Times!!! Andrews finds that post-Civil War slave accounts, in con-
 trast, stressed the strength and endurance of Blacks under slavery. The change
 suggests that the writers believed that in antebellum culture, the depiction of
 suffering had strategic value."4
 14 William L. Andrews, "The Representation of Slavery and the Rise of Afro-American Literary Realism, 1865-
 1920," in Slavery and the Literary Imagination, ed. Deborah E. McDowell and Arnold Rampersad (Baltimore,
 1989), 62-80, esp. 62-66; Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave,
 Written By Himself (1845; New York, 1968), 38-42; John Brown, Slave Life in Georgia: A Narrative of the Life,
 Sufferings, and Escape ofJohn Brown, A Fugitive Slave, ed. F. N. Boney (1855; Savannah, 1972), 35; William
 L. Andrews, To Tella Free Story: The First Century ofAfro-American Autobiography, 1760-1865 (Urbana, 1986),
 184-86. But William Andrews points out that in the 1850s some slave narrators began to stress their own acts
 of retaliation rather than their passive suffering; Andrews, "Representation of Slavery," 62-66.
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 In the 1840s and 1850s, the high point of the romantic movement in American
 literature, these narratives offered intimate glimpses into the tragedy of suffering
 that were more persuasive than reformers' didactic rhetoric: one ecstatic reviewer
 exclaimed, "What a combination of qualities and deeds and sufferings most fitted to
 attract human sympathy in each particular case!" First-person narratives established
 their authors as fully sentient and ardent in their desires for freedom, love, family;
 this contrast made their brutalization the more horrific.15
 After the breathtaking success of Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852, the flourishing
 print culture of popular sentimental fiction took up the work of exposure. Plays,
 poems, novels, and short stories all adapted themselves well to telling the slave's
 story, and in the 1850s they were churned out in record numbers. Most tempered
 their message by weaving descriptions of brutal corporal punishment into senti-
 mental stories depicting the lowly but loving slave family circle, its intimates, and
 the suffering entailed by its poignant destruction.16 Fictional accounts engaged
 readers' sympathies by fleshing out slaves as whole people rather than as cameos,
 and they brought the sordid facts to the notice of hundreds of thousands of northern
 readers too cautious or genteel to digest them undiluted.
 By the Civil War, then, the account of slave suffering designed to evoke a sympa-
 thetic response had established itself as an important social and cultural trope in
 the North. It was not just repetition that gave these stories their impact. Rather,
 they drew on and confirmed a major shift in religious sensibility, as American
 Protestants, influenced by the liberalization of doctrine, were revising their under-
 standing of the purpose and place of suffering in human life.
 "I Sing the Body Anesthetic"
 While both the theological and the humanitarian roots of the revulsion from cruelty
 lie in the eighteenth century and earlier, the modern sensibility that we associate
 with the legal protection of dependent classes flourished more fully in the nineteenth
 century. In this period another profound transformation was underway, the erosion
 of Calvinist orthodoxy and the emergence of a powerful alternative often labeled
 liberal Protestantism. One result was the reorientation of the relationship between
 religion and the body. In the antebellum era, liberal Unitarian clergy, shock troops
 in the assault on Calvinism, forged a Christian humanist philosophy that rejected
 15 Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Gates Jr., eds., The Slave's Narrative (New York, 1985), 19. Andrews
 interprets the slave narrator as revisionist, in Harold Bloom's definition, a writer who "wishes to open received
 texts to his own sufferings." So Frederick Douglass made his own experiences a yardstick against which to measure
 and reinterpret the Bible and the Declaration of Independence: See Andrews, To Tell a Free Story, 13-14.
 16 Philip Fisher, Hard Facts: Setting and Form in the American Novel (New York, 1985), 101-4. For an
 extensive bibliography, see Lorenzo Dow Turner, Anti-Slavery Sentiment in American Literature Prior to 1865
 (1929; Port Washington, 1966), 89-100.
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 the notion of cruelty, whether administered by divine or human hand.17 Their
 writings served as a primary source for abolitionist arguments about the inherent
 brutality of slavery. They also provided abolitionists with a new model for a claim
 to universal entitlement to bodily integrity, one that stood opposed to much diversit-
 arian scientific thought of the day and helped ground universal human rights. For
 a time liberal religious thought became the primary carrier of notions of individual
 integrity critical to liberal political theory.
 In its celebration of bodily integrity, the liberal religious order that emerged was
 revolutionary. The bleeding body had long been the centerpiece of Christianity;
 for medieval Christians, pain was both a confirmation of and a link to divinity.
 The inevitability of human suffering was glorified and transfigured in the Cruci-
 fixion, which forged a strong link between pain and divinity. Voluntary submission
 to pain contained its own grim joy, as witnessed by depictions of the trials of the
 saints. Protestant Reformers took most of the joy out of suffering, but they main-
 tained predestination, limited salvation, and original sin as doctrines central to
 Reformed theology. Such nineteenth-century reformers as William Ellery Channing
 characterized - and caricatured - Calvinism as teaching that, through no fall of their
 own, a substantial portion of mankind was "made liable to all miseries in this life,
 to death itself, and to. . . . 'most grievous torments in soul and body without
 intermission in hell-fire forever."''18
 Liberal religionists in the antebellum era rejected this harsh creed. They shifted
 their focus from the drama of God, the sovereign judge, sentencing the inherently
 depraved human to an afterlife of unremitting suffering, to that of God, the benevo-
 lent father, working for his children's physical and spiritual well-being. The purpose
 of worship shifted from the glorification of God to the salvation and celebration
 of man.19 This optimistic new theology included a celebration of the human body,
 that work of God "fearfully and wonderfully made." As Theodore Parker summed
 up this ethos, "the great work of mankind on earth is to . .. use, discipline, develop,
 and enjoy every limb of the body, every faculty of the spirit. "20
 The evolution of the doctrine of Atonement, or Christ's death as the guarantor
 of human salvation, typified shifting attitudes toward pain and punishment across
 17 Daniel Walker Howe, The Unitarian Conscience: HarvardMoralPhilosophy, 1805-1861 (Cambridge, Mass.,
 1970). For radical Unitarians who addressed themselves explicitly to social problems, see, for example, Donald
 Yacovone, SamuelJoseph May and the Dilemmas of the Liberal Persuasion, 1797-1871 (Philadelphia, 1991);
 Theodore Parker, The Slave Power, ed. James K. Hosmer (Boston, [1910]); and Theodore Parker, The Rights of
 Man in America, ed. F. B. Sanborn (Boston, 1911).
 18 David B. Morris, The Culture ofPain (Berkeley, 1991), 125-27; William E. Channing, "The Moral Argument
 Against Calvinism," in William E. Channing, The Works of William E. Channing, D.D., Eighth Complete
 Edition, with an Introduction (6 vols., Boston, 1848), I, 217-41, esp. 223; Ava Chamberlain, "The Theology of
 Cruelty: A New Look at the Rise of Arminianism in Eighteenth-Century New England," Harvard Theological
 Review, 85 (July 1992), 335-56.
 19 William E. Channing, "Unitarian Christianity: Discourse at the Ordination of the Rev. Jared Sparks," in
 Channing, Works, III, 59-103, esp. 83-87; H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original Sin (1955;
 New York, 1987), 60-85; Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal
 Authority, 1750-1800 (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), 155-94.
 20 [George Allen], Mr. Allen's Report ofa Declaration of Sentiments on Slavery, December5, 1837 (Worcester,
 1838), 6; Theodore Parker, Ten Sermons of Religion (New York, 1864), 4.
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 a wide spectrum of Protestant denominations, not just those formqlly labeled "lib-
 eral." By the late eighteenth century, Congregational ministers within the New
 Divinity movement urged that God ordained the Passion, not from a self-serving
 desire for retribution, but "from the most noble benevolence and regard to the
 public good." They concurred that Christ had probably not suffered real pain, or
 at least not in full human measure. By the nineteenth century, most Protestants,
 despite differences across and even within denominations, had come to share a
 tender-minded distaste for the extravagant agony of the Passion .21 Some in the liberal
 wing, Quakers and Unitarians, altogether rejected the efficacy of the Crucifixion in
 effecting human salvation, discarding what had stood for nearly two millennia as
 the central theological construct of Christianity and the most profound link between
 God and man.22
 The transition from a punitive to a benevolent God advanced the reinterpretation
 of human pain, and the antislavery movement drew heavily on this new reading.
 Unavoidable suffering, such as sickness, remained an inevitable part of human
 experience, but liberal theology severed the link between punitive or deliberately
 inflicted pain and religious experience and downgraded the role of suffering in
 moral growth. The rejection of avoidable or intentionally caused suffering was not
 just a by-product of the movement against religious orthodoxy, but one of its main
 goals. Nineteenth-century reformers indicted orthodox Calvinism as incorporating
 the most terrible and prolonged suffering into the heart of its philosophy. Parker
 told an archetypal story of the grim imprint of a Calvinist childhood, recounting
 fearful hours spent in frigid churches contemplating the inevitable descent into
 the fires of hell.23
 Although in their own philosophy liberal clerics integrated the experiences of
 body and soul, they juxtaposed the two in a way that ran radically counter to the
 medieval Christian model. There, the tension arose from the shocking opposition
 of the free soul to its racked body -the smiling Saint Sebastian full of arrows. For
 nineteenth-century liberals, however, the tension arose from the presence of pain
 itself, which signaled, not spiritual triumph, but a breach of divinely ordained
 laws. Liberal religionists embraced a model of natural religion that sought God's
 will in the workings of the natural world rather than in scriptural revelation. From
 Jonathan Edwards Ur.], "Three Sermons," in The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises, ed. Edwards A.
 Park (Boston, 1859), 1-42, esp. 36; Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History ofthe New England Theology (Chicago,
 1907); Dorus Paul Rudisill, The Doctrine of the Atonement in Jonathan Edwards and His Successors (New York,
 1971). For a critique of this doctrinal shift as a decline into sentimentalism, see Douglas, Feminization ofAmerican
 Culture, 143-96.
 22 Howe, Unitarian Conscience, 42, 98; Bliss Forbush, Elias Hicks: Quaker Liberal (New York, 1956), 200;
 Elias Hicks, Letters (New York, 1834), 67, 127-28; Jerome Hall, "Biblical Atonement and Modern Criminal Law,"
 Journal of Law and Religion, 1 (no. 2, 1983), 279-95.
 23 Albert Barnes, The Atonement In Its Relations to Law and Moral Government (Philadelphia, 1860), 240-
 42; James Freeman Clarke, Orthodoxy: Its Truths and Errors (1866; Boston, 1926), 252-54; John Weiss, Life and
 Correspondence of Theodore Parker (2 vols., London, 1863), I, 30; Chamberlain, "Theology of Cruelty." On the
 persistent power of the Christlike image of the suffering slave, see Walters, Antislavery Appeal, 57-59; Jane
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 their emphasis on the harmonious interactions in the natural realm, they inferred
 that the states of the body and soul were congruent, whether in pain or pleasure.
 God in his benevolence had so laid out the physical world that those who obeyed
 his laws would prosper. Only those who flouted the laws of human nature courted
 misfortune; and their suffering was the spontaneous consequence of their law-
 breaking, rather than the punitive revenge of a sovereign God.24
 The conviction that God's will could be read in the structure of the natural
 world relocated the sources of religious authority and, potentially, those of political
 authority. Interpreting pain as flowing from the breach of a natural law moved it
 from the realm of normal human experience and toward the status of an anomaly.
 A body in pain - particularly pain deliberately inflicted by another - became com-
 pelling evidence of human transgression; thus, a policy or system built on governance
 by pain could impugn the legitimacy of the government sponsoring it. For many
 abolitionists, the enormity and seeming randomness of eternal damnation came
 to epitomize the arbitrary abuse of sovereign power, and their revulsion against it
 fueled their participation in humanitarian reforms."
 While the role of pain in religious thought was being transformed, its medical
 significance was undergoing a swift revision. In a convenient sleight of hand, the
 medical profession assumed epistemological responsibility for pain just as it dropped
 out as an underpinning of theology. In the early nineteenth century, doctors began
 characterizing pain as a treatable pathology rather than as divine punishment or
 common biological medium; this was most dramatically marked by the first use of
 anesthesia at Massachusetts General Hospital in 1846. The reassignment of physical
 agony as a medical or therapeutic problem offered a comprehensive alternative
 explanation to those seeking to discard it from their theology and bolstered aboli-
 tionist attempts to set pain outside the common realm of human interaction.26
 In other respects, however, abolitionists were moving against the scientific tide
 in their attempts to portray slaves' pain as real. "Scientific" arguments for the
 inferiority of Blacks had plagued the antislavery movement for years. Well before
 the writings of Charles Darwin, the entrenched popular theory of the Great Chain
 of Being set out a hierarchy of creation. Departing from the Linnaean classification
 of "species," the theory divided humans into ranked groups on the basis of physical
 type. Among humans, those of African descent ranked low on the scale, only just
 24 Barnes and Dumond, eds., Letters of Weld, Grimke, and Grimke, I, 491; Martin S. Pernick, A Calculus
 of Suffering: Pain, Professionalism, and Anesthesia in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1985), 48-49.
 For natural religion's place in Unitarianism, see Howe, Unitarian Conscience, 69-92.
 25 Milton Meltzer and Patricia G. Holland, eds., Lydia Maria Child, Selected Letters, 1817-1880 (Amherst,
 1982), 335; Silvan Tomkins, "The Psychology of Commitment: The Constructive Role of Violence and Suffering
 for the Individual and for His Society," in The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin
 Duberman (Princeton, 1965), 270-98; Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World
 (New York, 1985).
 26 Pernick, Calculus of Suffering; Judith Walzer Leavitt, Brought to Bed: Childbearing in America, 1750-
 1950 (New York, 1986), 116-41.
 474 The Journal of American History September 1995
 above the highest animals. Defenders of slavery often invoked the almost subhuman
 status of African Americans.27
 This theory of the dominant and subordinate standings of different races contrib-
 uted to the belief, widely held in the nineteenth century, that racial groups differed
 in their physiological responses to pain. According to the popular hierarchy of
 sensibility, women, whites, and the rich ranked as the most sensitive to pain. Equally
 predictably, people of African descent were classed together with criminals and
 Indians as virtually impervious to physical trauma, a trait one Louisiana physician
 labeled as "a peculiar instinct protecting it against the abuses of arbitrary power."
 "Research" by southern doctors also discovered a disease hereditary in the line of
 African descent called "dyaesthesia Aethiopsis," an "obtuse sensibility of body"
 that reportedly made its victims insensitive to the effects of corporal punishment.
 One researcher carefully noted his surprise when, upon his pouring boiling water
 down the spine of a slave, the patient leaped up in agony.28
 Against this backdrop, the reiterations in antislavery literature of the agony
 experienced by slaves during whippings and other punishments took on a revolu-
 tionary quality. Such depictions were designed to rouse northern consciences lulled
 by the myth that Black Americans experienced abuse differently. Many northerners
 may have considered deliberately inflicted pain taboo. But to push for protection
 they had to believe that the slave had "the same susceptibilities of suffering . . .
 inherent in the constitutions of all animals. . . . [that] his body suffers from hunger
 and thirst, cold and nakedness, imprisonment and corporal punishment, hard labor
 and want of rest." The portrayal of a slave's pain proved the likeness of the human
 body across racial lines; as an abolitionist, Miss Smith, wrote of seeing a slave beaten
 by a mob, "I am ready to testify that it was orthodox blood. I should not have
 known it from my own." Advocates courted the outrage of their listeners by telling
 stories of masters treating slaves as if they were animals, particularly tales of the
 use and chastisement of slaves' bodies. The anarchist provocateur Parker Pillsbury
 reportedly made that point by going through the rite of baptism with a dog, forcing
 the fuming spectators to examine their own presumptions about who was a fit
 recipient of the sacraments and who was not.29
 The antebellum campaign to establish slaves as fully sentient beings with God-
 given physical sensibilities provided a refurbished vehicle for a philosophy of univer-
 salism- and so potentially for universal entitlement- at a time when Enlightenment
 27 James Turner, Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian Mind (Baltimore,
 1980), 7; Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore,
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 1865," in Antislavery Vanguard, ed. Duberman, 156-77.
 28 Pernick, Calculus of Suffering, 15 5-56; Todd Savitt, "The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and
 Demonstration in the Old South," Journal of Southern History, 48 (Aug. 1982), 331-48.
 29 Angelina Grimke, "Slavery is Cruel to the Body, Heart, Mind, and Soul of the Slave," typescript, n.d.,
 box 19, Weld-GrimkE Papers (William Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Report ofa Delegate
 to the Antislavery Convention ofAmerican Women Held in Philadelphia, May, 1838 (Boston, 1838), 15; Proceed-
 ings of the American Anti-Slavery Society At Its Second Decade (1854; Westport, 1970), 69; Parker Pillsbury,
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 thought, which had helped check any tendency to exaggerate human difference in
 the early years of the Republic, had lost much of its force. In doing so, it went
 against both popular thought and a growing body of scientific work whose focus
 on physical differences among races threatened to destroy the intellectual basis of
 the argument for universal human rights.30 Antislavery workers, drawing on the
 ascendant liberal religious teachings, kept the competing ideal of universal rights
 alive in the tradition of Christian equalitarianism. They relied heavily on religious
 arguments to make the slave's case, mixing them with natural rights theory in a way
 that made the two perfectly compatible. Emphasizing Christian humanist notions of
 the value of each life, they asserted that Christianity rejected all distinctions of
 superiority and inferiority among races or classes of humankind: to set slaves apart
 was a form of atheism, a retreat from the "common table of humanity. "'31
 But while Enlightenment universalism was rooted in a belief in standard, spe-
 cieswide typologies, antebellum universalism was of necessity more complex. The
 language of standardization did not sit well in a culture becoming attuned to
 romantic notions of the depth and diversity of human experience, rather than its
 interchangeability. In the case of slavery, it was the intensely individual experience
 of suffering - experienced by the highborn and lowborn alike - and its demand for
 attention that conferred equality. Abolitionists charged northerners with "hypoc-
 risy" because they "oozed sympathy" for Europe's suffering hordes while ignoring
 slaves. The demand for equal treatment presupposed that all sufferers are similarly
 situated and deserving of sympathetic relief. In the 1830s the universal duty of
 benevolent sympathy to the show of suffering took over where an Enlightened belief
 in uniformity left off.32
 Sympathy, Sensibility, and Revivalism
 Within religious thought, it was the liberal Protestant denominations, in particular,
 Unitarianism, that championed the new celebration of the integrity of the body.
 But the liberalizing trend toward the benevolent, unpunishing God also touched
 all but the most crabbed of orthodox Calvinists, establishing a common ground
 from which reformers could condemn cruelty and preparing a Christian audience
 receptive to their criticism.
 30 George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and
 Destiny, 1817-1914 (Middletown, 1971), 71-96; James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists
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 Similarly, evangelical religious practice made popular a style of moral reasoning
 from sympathy and compassion that was best developed in the revival churches,
 but that was also a familiar and comfortable mode for liberal religionists. Liberal
 Unitarians feared the excesses of enthusiasm displayed at the rowdier revival meet-
 ings and repeated at antislavery meetings. But their rationalism -particularly among
 those most opposed to slavery -accommodated the moral and religious sentiments
 as beneficial in their appropriate place. Within abolitionism the duty to sympathize
 with slaves was not a tenet limited to the evangelical party. William Lloyd Garrison
 kept a figure of a kneeling slave on his mantelpiece "to keep my sympathies from
 flagging. " Channing stressed that people should not "turn away from the contempla-
 tion of human sufferings.... It is meant to call forth deep sympathy with human
 natUre."33 Thus, sympathy-a term that in the nineteenth century encompassed
 empathy as well - became a common construct across a wide spectrum of antislavery
 rhetoric. In antebellum thought, sympathy was a complex process in which the
 observer's willed attentiveness to another's suffering gave rise to an intuitive em-
 pathic identification with the other's experiences. The habit of sympathy was a part
 of many Christians' religious practice, a habit that abolitionists drew on in their
 presentation of the suffering of slaves.
 The rise of a sympathetic or affective mode of moral reasoning is an overdeter-
 mined phenomenon, appearing first in English religious thought and literature.
 In moral philosophy, the tradition of ethical sentimentalism launched by Anthony
 Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, made familiar the notion that a moral
 sense enabled individuals to judge an act according to their own subjective responses.
 Shaftesbury's ideal of the moral sense, elaborated by such followers as Francis Hutcheson
 and Adam Smith, aided in the transition from the belief that morality was revealed
 in the Scriptures to the notion that it was best studied in the innate intuitions and
 sentiments of humankind.34
 In America, evangelicalism became the popular locus for the affective style; the
 conversion experience offered an immediate, personal connection with God forged
 in moments of heightened emotional sensibility. The first Great Awakening of the
 1740s had challenged the cold, dry legalism of orthodoxy with an appeal to an
 affective style of religious experience. The stress on a warmer bond with God also
 3 Liberator, Feb. 22, 1834, p. 31; William E. Channing, "Slavery," in Works, II, 5-153, esp. 58, 123-28.
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 Larry Ingle, Quakers in Conflict: The Hicksite Reformation (Knoxville, 1986), 41-45, 66-67, 82-83.
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 offered a new paradigm for interpersonal relationships. By the late eighteenth
 century, James Essig suggests, the benevolent Christian "entered into a sympathetic
 relationship with other individuals and thereby multiplied the sources of emotional
 gratification." Many envisioned "the good society as a network of benevolent be-
 lievers, united by ties of sentiment, their hearts quivering with affectionate regard
 for the well-being of others." Inspired by this new association of Christian benevo-
 lence with sympathy for others, certain evangelical groups in the last quarter of the
 century turned their "tender feelings" toward the first brief movement against slavery. 35
 Thirty years later, the Second Great Awakening served as an important backdrop
 for a variety of antebellum reforms. Evangelicalism continued to privilege feelings
 over intellect and to repudiate the doctrinal formalism of seventeenth- and eigh-
 teenth-century Protestantism as a loveless exercise, "all hic haec hoc and no God
 in it." The move toward a religion of the heart was a critical step away from the
 hard "system" of Calvinism, and the revival meeting with its public prayer and
 testimony created a community of intense feeling. By the 1830s, then, many Ameri-
 cans turned for guidance to the emotions over the intellect, identifying the moral
 sense more with feeling than with rational thought.36
 The revival of passionate antislavery organization in the early 1830s followed
 directly on the heels of the great wave of revivalism inaugurated by Charles Finney
 in the 1820s, and it tracked the forms of revivalism closely. 3 Many early abolitionists,
 particularly those in the New York circle of the brothers Arthur and Lewis Tappan,
 had been in training for the ministry and were deeply influenced by revivalism,
 and by Finney in particular. Some took up abolition as a sacred vocation in the
 aftermath of the student debates at Lane Seminary in Cincinnati in 1834, and they
 drew a strong analogy between the suddenness of conversion and the immediate
 emancipation they sought for the slave.38
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 The force of the abolitionists' appeal to sympathy for the slave was directly bound
 up with the career of revivalism and derived much of its power from the same
 source. Finney and his brethren perfected techniques for stirring crowds to an emo-
 tional pitch as a preliminary to a conversion experience. Antislavery agents schooled
 themselves in similar tactics, describing their role as kindling, warming, "combus-
 tionizing" their listeners. Using intense feeling as the touchstone for authentic
 spiritual experience, their greatest measure of success - frequently achieved - was that
 they had left "not . . . a dry eye" in the house.39
 Revivalism's style of reaching the crowd provided a close model for abolitionists'
 attempts to awaken a compassionate response in their own audiences, for by the
 Second Great Awakening, evangelicalism had embraced moral sympathy, in a form
 that owed much to its eighteenth-century Scottish forebear. While the idea of moral
 sympathy can be traced through Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and David Hume, it
 was most fully developed in an early work by Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral
 Sentiments. Designed to combat the Hobbesian notion that human nature is basi-
 cally self-interested, it also addressed the problem of civil governance in a world
 of romantic individuals: How can we create binding, universal legal and political
 conventions when we have so little understanding of the interior emotions and
 needs of others? For Smith, sympathy -the willed act of knowing a fellow being -
 was the answer.
 By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves
 enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become
 in some measure the same person with him.... His agonies ... when we have
 thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then
 tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels.40
 Only through this act of imagination was it possible to grasp the subjective experience
 of another well enough to understand his needs; for "the man whose sympathy
 keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonableness of my sorrow." Sym-
 pathy, then, allowed individuals to act in the social and political spheres in a benevo-
 lent way that acknowledged the needs and passions of others.41
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 Evangelicals agreed on the beneficial effects of sympathy: as one minister said
 of his congregants, "Never do they love one another so well as when they witness
 the outpouring of each other's hearts in prayer," assuming that to witness another's
 strong emotion was to enter into it.42 But sympathy represented praxis, not theory.
 Evangelicals did not believe the sympathetic response to be automatic or involun-
 tary. As Finney preached, we should "command our attention" to certain things,
 and by so doing "emotions will come up, by the very laws of mind." Evangelicals
 preached a duty to turn one's mind to things that would evoke moral sympathy.
 To do so was to use one "means" at the individual's disposal to prepare to accept
 God's grace; to refuse to "dwell on things calculated to excite warm and overpowering
 feelings" showed a deficiency in the Christian spirit.43
 Crusading members of the American Anti-Slavery Society in the 1830s solicited
 audiences with a religious model of sympathetic conversion in mind. Like revivalists,
 abolitionists preached a duty to exhort, to "recite the tale of woe in the ear of your
 children, family, friends and neighbors, to enkindle a similar feeling in them." As
 Theodore Weld cautioned Angelina Grimke Weld about their young son: "I rejoice
 that you are taking pains to cultivate little Charleys sympathy and compassion by
 showing him the poor slaves in the hold of the slave ship. Pray do it often constantly.
 The only way effectually to cultivate those elements in the mind of a child is to
 show them suffering objects. " Abolitionists themselves practiced sympathy conscien-
 tiously, as if it were an exercise. John Rankin tutored his compassion by picturing
 his family as slaves being whipped; but as his "imagination depicted in lively colors,
 their tears, their shrieks, and bloody stripes," he found himself too agitated to go
 on.44 Tracts and speeches instructed readers and listeners to imagine that they were
 being whipped or to imagine that their children were standing on the auction block.
 Such exercises depended on and fostered strong identification with the slave's
 presumed response. For Elizabeth Margaret Chandler, for example, the key to eman-
 cipation was compassion; and the key to compassion was "mental metempsychosis."
 Were northerners to "imagine themselves for a few moments in [the slave's] very
 circumstances, to enter into his feelings, comprehend all his wretchedness, transform
 (New York, 1983), 181-91. ForJean-Jacques Rousseau's related construction of sympathy and compassion, which
 would have been familiar to some American readers in this period as well, see David Marshall, The Surprising
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 themselves mentally into his very self, they would not surely long withhold their com-
 passion."45
 Like Smith's work on moral sentiments, abolitionist literature suggested that the
 effort to observe and enter into another's feelings served as a foundation of social
 life: sympathy was both a "powerful principle which binds man to his fellow" and
 a call to action. The slave owner understands his white peers; "with them he identifies
 himself, and towards them the sympathies of his nature ... are exercised"; sympathy
 allows them to create a polity. His inability to identify with slaves, though, meant
 that he could not regard them as "allied to him by any relation calling for sympathy
 . .. . [although] it is over this latter race that he possesses power" -hence the
 failure to extend "justice, benevolence, and charity" to the slave.46
 In addition to laying the groundwork for the appeal to moral sympathy, evangel-
 ical revivalism also provided a model for abolitionists by its innovation in pulpit
 storytelling. Eighteenth-century sermons rarely used anecdotes drawn from secular
 life, relying instead on biblical parables to illustrate doctrinal points. By 1800 a
 new style of preaching had come into vogue: anecdotal rather than doctrinal, it
 embraced the moral value of human experience. Finney was the most prominent
 exponent of pulpit storytelling; like many religious thinkers influenced by Scottish
 common sense philosophy, he saw the natural world and human life as a source
 for instructional material. He argued that the preacher's diction should be conversa-
 tional, his illustrations drawn from the common business of society. He encouraged
 would-be revivalists to approach their stories as an actor would, who resolves to
 throw himself into the spirit and meaning of the writer, as to adopt his sentiments,
 make them his own, feel them, embody them, throw them out upon the audience
 as living reality. . . And if by "theatrical" be meant the strongest possible
 representation of the sentiments expressed, then the more theatrical a sermon
 is, the better.47
 For the well-told story provided the audience with a cathartic experience; through
 a fully realized rendition of another's spiritual sufferings, the listener's own heart
 would often be changed. The fact that, on Sundays, Christians were edified from
 the pulpit by stories of individuals like themselves in distress probably predisposed
 them to listen to abolitionists' anecdotes with a more practiced ear.
 Abolitionist writers and lecturers were ingenious in their use of sources that
 aroused sympathy and compassion. Southern newspapers provided a steady supply
 of ads for runaways with grotesque scars, mangled limbs, missing members, and
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 other deformities inflicted under slavery. Another favorite technique was the publi-
 cation of excerpts from southern legal codes, showing the lenient fine levied on
 any individual who should "wilfully cut out the tongue, put out the eye, castrate,
 or cruelly scald, burn or deprive any slave of any limb or member" - and then only
 if the tormentor were convicted.48
 Abolitionists noted that visual images also stirred readers, and they took advan-
 tage of the new importance of visual culture. The image of the enchained or abused
 slave became a cultural icon and made its way into music and popular fiction and
 onto knickknacks and souvenirs. Songs and stories such as "The Bereaved Slave,"
 "O Pity the Poor Slave Mother," and "The Little Blind Slave Boy" passed lightly
 over the gory details while playing on themes of suffering and sympathy familiar
 to readers of sentimental literature. The store owned by the well-known abolitionist
 Tappan brothers sold prints depicting "The Poor Slave" in four different poses, as
 well as "'handsome' plaster manikins of slaves in chains for only fifty cents apiece."
 Mite boxes, handkerchiefs, and other paraphernalia distributed by the American
 Anti-Slavery Society bore the familiar image of the kneeling slave. At a meeting
 of female reformers, Sarah Grimke moved that such pictorial representations be
 increased a hundredfold, so that the "speechless agony of the fettered slave may
 unceasingly appeal to the heart of the patriot, the philanthropist, and the christian. "49
 Abolitionists also strove to make their language as vivid as possible, fostering
 in audiences the feeling that a direct line of physical sensation linked them to the
 slave. Readers and listeners could then judge the morality of slavery by their own
 subjective responses to the physical and moral degradation inherent in the system.
 While some antislavery fiction played solely on the genteel sentimental themes
 well known to readers of midcentury popular literature, such writers as Child, Weld,
 and George Bourne did not scruple to use graphic, vivid language of a kind then
 thought unsuitable for polite society. Elizabeth Margaret Chandler described the
 northern dinner table with its use of slave-harvested sugar as a scene of gothic
 horror: "I have fancied that the death-sigh of some unfortunate victim of oppression
 might be yet trembling on the bosom of a jelly . .. A pound cake seems like the
 sepulchre of the broken heart with which it may, perhaps, have been purchased,
 and the delicious ice to wear the red tinge of human blood." Chandler, the first
 writer to make a direct empathic appeal through her columns in the Genius of
 Universal Emancipation, denied that she was catering to "a display of benevolent
 feeling, or the indulgence of an amiable humanity." Such lines as "Amid her
 weeping babes she knelt, and o'er her crouching head / The white man's lash in
 mockery swung, all newly stain'd with red" make a shocking parody of the family
 grouping so familiar from sentimental literature. Ralph Waldo Emerson affirmed
 48 L. Maria Child, The Patriarchal Institution, As Described By Members of Its Own Family (New York, 1860),
 10-16; George M. Stroud, A Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery in the Several States of the United States
 of America (Philadelphia, 1856), 25.
 49 Anti-Slavery Songs From the Best Anti-Slavery Authors (Salem, Ohio, 1849); Wyatt-Brown, Lewis Tappan,
 155, 143; Proceedings ofthe Anti-Slavery Convention ofAmerican Women ... 1837, 14; Yellin, Women andSisters.
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 the strong effects created by images of old men and pregnant women being whipped:
 "The blood is moral: the blood is anti-slavery: it runs cold in the veins: the stomach
 rises with disgust, and curses slavery."50
 To create an immediate experience, abolitionist writing sometimes adopted a
 stylized first-person voice to describe a slave's experience. More commonly, it drew
 liberally from published or unpublished slave narratives. Testimony from a former
 Louisiana resident used a different technique to describe a whipping:
 The blood flows, the long wounds cross each other, strips of skin are raised without
 softening . . . the hand of the executioner. . . . The reader is moved; so am I:
 my agitated hand refuses to trace the bloody picture, to recount how many times
 the piercing cry of pain has interrupted my silent occupations.
 This passage creates an extraordinary physical economy between master, slave, nar-
 rator, and reader: the ruthlessness of the master's hand causes the writer's hand to
 tremble; the slave's cry becomes noise in the writer's quiet room; the reader is
 moved as well. Another of the witnesses in American Slavery As It Is reported in
 a narrative on slave catching that he had recently been bitten by a dog used to
 hunt slaves; the reader can all but feel the teeth.51
 The imagery of the chain took on a complex set of meanings in this period. In
 the most obvious sense, the falling away of real or spiritual chains signaled a new
 life for those in bondage to sin and slavery both. But the chain had positive connota-
 tions as well. Resonance and reverberation through a chain provided a physical
 metaphor that captured the essence of sympathy: one link vibrates and its near
 neighbor quivers in response. Using a similar construction, contemporary scientific
 thought concluded that the imagination, working through the body's nervous system,
 "allowed our distress to create in another person sensations of sympathy that link
 us together in a chain of feeling. 512 A central trope in evangelical antislavery rhetoric,
 the chain represented an imagery with powerful social implications at odds with
 a liberal model of autonomous individualism.
 Women made particular contributions to the social model of the sympathetic
 response. The generic story of the male slave whipped touched a chord with audi-
 ences, but few men were likely to find themselves in similar situations. All mothers,
 though, slave and free, understood danger to their children; the store of harrowing
 maternal fears could accommodate multiple unlikely variations. Tracts and essays
 sought to rouse maternal instincts in defense of slave women and children. Mothers
 50 Chandler, Essays, 87, 28; Elizabeth Margaret Chandler, The Poetical Works of Elizabeth Margaret Chandler
 (Philadelphia, 1836), 63; R. W. Emerson, Address Delivered in the Courthouse in Concord, Massachusetts on
 1st August, 1844, on the Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies (Boston,
 1844), 6; John Ashworth, "The Relationship between Capitalism and Humanitarianism," in Antislavery Debate,
 ed. Bender.
 51 Weld, American Slavery As It Is, 59, 15. On the "staggering number of slave interviews, autobiographies,
 and letters" in abolitionist periodical literature, see John Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in
 the Antebellum South (New York, 1979), 378.
 52 Essig, Bonds of Wickedness, 40-41. On scientific ideas about sympathy, see Morris, Culture ofPain, 207;
 and WalterJackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England(New York,
 1946), 100.
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 then forced by your tyrant to comply." Stories of sexual assault, affronting as they
 did the powerful cultural construction of women's modesty and chastity, were among
 the most shocking to northern audiences.54
 Adopting the cultural trope of women's defenselessness, reformers argued that
 female slaves suffered far more under the violent regime than males. This "unparal-
 lelled suffering" of women slaves gave rise to claims to a special calling: it was
 natural that "all women should feel most for the sufferings and degradations of
 their own sex," and that they should wish to act on their sisters' behalf. Sympathy
 was not the exclusive province of women: the Grimkes and other women on the
 antislavery circuit adapted the tactics of evangelical revivalism to incite audience
 response, much as their male counterparts did. But abolitionists of both sexes
 suggested that, for women, sympathy was less a willed than an automatic response,
 that sympathetic interaction was women's natural metier. What was women's work?
 "It is to sympathize with human misery. It is to breathe sympathy into man's
 heart." 55
 The vogue of sympathy had a broader currency through its association with
 sentimental literature, a genre closely connected to women writers. Domestic fiction
 flourished on the crest of the expansion of the publishing industry in the first half
 of the nineteenth century. While antislavery novels constituted just one part of
 the total output, women's sentimental fiction routinely relied on appeals to emotion
 to evoke pity for the weak and distressed, leading the reader to "compassionate,"
 across barriers of status and race, with those whose suffering demonstrated their
 evident humanity. Women reformers and writers, then, drew on an established
 tradition, but they pioneered new cultural forms that were instrumental in allowing
 the attribution of sentience - particularly the ability to suffer - to slaves.56
 Ann Douglas has suggested that sentimentalism replaced theology in nineteenth-
 century religious experience.57 This is only partially true, but to the extent that
 religious teaching centering on the interpretation of doctrine gave way to "pulpit
 storytelling" or the use of narrative texts, readers and listeners had greater latitude
 54 [George Bourne], Slavery Illustrated in Its Effects Upon Woman and Domestic Society (1837; Freeport,
 N.Y., 1972), 126; Ronald G. Walters, "The Erotic South: Civilization and Sexuality in American Abolitionism,"
 American Quarterly, 25 (May 1973), 177-201; Ashworth, "Relationship between Capitalism and Humanitari-
 anism," 180-99, esp. 197; Karen Sanchez-Eppler, Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of
 the Body (Berkeley, 1993), 21-23, 32-41.
 "S Liberator, July 27, 1838, p. 117; [Maria Weston Chapman], Ninth Annual Report of the Boston Female
 Anti-Slavery Society ... 1842 (Boston, 1842), 26; [Maria Weston Chapman], Right and Wrong in Boston: Report
 of the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society . .. 1835 (Boston, 1836), 87. On the possible link between women's
 perceived weakness and the genre of sentimental literature, see Nina Baym, Woman's Fiction: A Guide to Novels
 by and about Women in America, 1820-70 (Urbana, 1993), xxxv-xlii.
 56 On women publishing, see Mary Kelley, Private Woman, Public Stage: Literary Domesticity in Nineteenth-
 Century America (New York, 1984), esp. 6-12; and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, Doing Literary Business: American
 Women Writers in the Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1990). Abolitionist periodicals such as the Genius of
 Universal Emancipation and the Liberator had "ladies departments" that regularly published sentimental poems
 and sketches focusing on the plight of slaves: Sanchez-Eppler, Touching Liberty, 23-32. On sentimentalism and
 the appeal to emotion, see Elizabeth White, "Sentimental Heresies: Rethinking The Feminization of American
 Culture," Intellectual History Newsletter, 15 (Boston, 1993), 23-31; Fisher, Hard Facts, 118-22; Baym, Woman's
 Fiction, xx, xxvii-xxxii.
 57 Douglas, Feminization of American Culture, 143-96.
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 for interpretation. Similarly, both abolitionist narrative accounts and sentimental
 fiction dwelling on the "poor slave" sought to evoke a subjective emotional reaction
 that seemingly allowed each audience member to respond from the heart in his
 or her own fashion.
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 In part, of course, this freedom was illusory. The expectations set up by formulaic
 or didactic storytelling enhanced the message that all right-feeling people should
 experience empathic revulsion on exposure to images of cruelty, although that
 revulsion was exactly the cultural attitude at issue. Part of antislavery literature's
 ''cultural work" was to provide a set of interpretive conventions for its images and
 anecdotes. These didactic messages enhanced the "stability" (or, fixed the meaning)
 of the representations of slaves in pain, representations that, in the absence of a
 strong normative context, could just as easily be greeted with unsympathetic emo-
 tions like sadistic pleasure or contempt.58
 At the same time, the open-ended nature of the storytelling format allowed
 large numbers of listeners or readers to imagine themselves in joint sympathetic
 enterprise with their neighbors; and unlike theology or politics, narrative presenta-
 tions did not expose the cracks in this fellow feeling by forcing debate over concrete
 tenets. In part for this reason, the movement of the trope of the suffering slave
 from the political realm of abolitionism into popular literary culture allowed the
 convergence of much northern public opinion in condemnation of masters' violent
 discipline of slaves."9
 In this light, Nina Baym sees sentimentalism "not as evasive self-absorption but
 as a practical philosophy of community" based on "public sympathy and benevolent
 fellow-feeling." Domestic literature offered the perfect exercise in sympathy; its
 reader, as Dugald Stewart had earlier suggested, follows "in imagination, the unfor-
 tunate man to his dwelling, and partakes with him and his family in their domestic
 distresses. " The home was revealed as the site of entry into private spaces and feelings
 that sparked the sympathetic imagination. An abolitionist exhorted, "look at [the
 slave's] person. . . . Follow [the slaves] next to their huts ... see them groaning."
 For antebellum reformers, as for Smith and his followers, the "communion of feeling
 and sympathy" created a benevolent order between strangers that substituted for
 defective legal and political arrangements.60
 Historians have by and large criticized or dismissed abolitionists' arguments from
 empathy.6' But in the antebellum era, compassionate identification with others
 played a positive role, forming conduits for arguments about the extension of
 individual rights to suffering others. The spare liberal notion of bodily autonomy
 made its way into the courts cloaked in sentimental garb. Sympathy was often
 identified as a womanly trait, and women's transforming role in abolitionism, reviv-
 58 Tompkins, Sensational Designs, 124-27; Scarry, Body in Pain, 13-14. For narratives of suffering as they
 shape arguments for legal redress, see Kathryn Abrams, "Hearing the Call of Stories," California Law Review,
 79 (July 1991), 971-1052.
 59 Brodhead, Cultures of Letters, 13-47.
 60 Baym, Woman's Fiction, xxix-xxx; Dugald Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy ofthe Human Mind(Boston,
 1821), 272; Weld, American Slavery As It Is, 16-17; Liberator, Feb. 25, 1837, p. 33. For the pitfalls of northern
 women's overidentification with enslaved women, see Yellin, Women and Sisters, 78-79.
 61 See, for example, Eric Foner, "Abolitionism and the Labor Movement in Antebellum America," in Anti-
 Slavery, Religion, and Reform, ed. Bolt and Drescher, 254-71; and Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in
 American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850 (New York, 1969), 243-44.
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 alism, and sentimental literature - important sites of compassionate rhetoric - is
 well documented. At the same time, the vogue of sympathy was not contained or
 captured by any discrete grouping defined by gender, theology, or reform faction.
 Precisely because it flourished at so many different points within the culture, fellow
 feeling for those in pain gave new scope to arguments for the rights of the person
 that were innovative in both substance and style.
 "The Surprising Effects of Sympathy"62
 Antislavery rights discourse was a lay, rather than a legal, tradition, fluid precisely
 because it did not depend on the revealed word of a statute or constitutional amend-
 ment; it included broader claims than would ultimately be recognized by courts
 or legislatures. But its repugnance to slavery's personalized violence and its claims
 of self-ownership and bodily autonomy for slaves struck a note that would persist
 in the evolution of individual rights consciousness. David Brion Davis has described
 abolitionism as emblematic of "a new system that redefined rewards, punishment,
 and the kind of undeserved 'suffering' that ought to arouse the sympathy of
 strangers. " The moral conventions produced by that new order were not transcendent
 or absolute, and often not victorious in the human arena; nonetheless, over time
 they have become incorporated as a persistent strand in our rights tradition.63
 In the eighteenth century, the individual's quota of rights as laid out by the
 Declaration of Independence and the Constitution enabled him to vote, to speak,
 to own property, to enjoy the protection of the legal system, and to participate in
 public life. Nineteenth-century abolitionists expanded on these entitlements to
 claim in addition "rights" more in keeping with a vision of human nature that
 stressed the individual's sentient experience. Indeed, at times abolitionist rhetoric
 based the claim to rights on the very capacity to suffer and feel pain -what one
 slave narrator called "the sacred rights of the weak." Frederick Douglass phrased
 it more concisely: "If he knows enough to be hanged, he knows enough to vote."
 Out of this formulation grew a novel vision of government as obliged to provide
 special safeguards for the downtrodden, whose rights claims, Channing suggested,
 were "enhanced, on the ground that the suffering and injured are entitled to pecu-
 liar regard."64
 62 This is a phrase of the French playwright Pierre de Marivaux, adopted by Marshall, Surprising Effects of
 Sympathy, 9.
 63 Davis, "Perils of Doing History," 294; Hartog, "Constitution of Aspiration." Rights did not take their
 preeminent place in American constitutional history until after the Civil War. See Morton Keller, "Powers and
 Rights: Two Centuries of American Constitutionalism,"Journal of American History, 74 (Dec. 1987), 675-94.
 For a compelling essay on the growth of human rights conventions, see Thomas L. Haskell, "The Curious Persistence
 of Rights Talk in the 'Age of Interpretation,"' ibid., 984-1012.
 6' Andrews, "Representation of Slavery," 68; Proceedings of the American Anti-Slavery Society At Its Third
 Decade . .. 1863 (1864; New York, 1969), 114; William E. Channing, "Duty of the Free States," in Channing,
 Works, VI, 231-373, esp. 243; Sanchez-Eppler, Touching Liberty, 1-49.
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 Despite their violent quarrels, abolitionists from all factions concurred that the
 right of self-ownership was a precondition to the enjoyment of other rights, and
 that all slaves should immediately be credited with "a fee simple in their own blood,
 bones, and brains." Taken by itself, the phrase self- ownership did not reveal its
 component parts. But abolitionists consistently enumerated a category of natural
 rights derived from the physical wants and needs of the body on its daily rounds.
 Four claims in particular stand out: the right to freedom of movement; the right
 to marry and establish domestic relations; the right of a female slave to refuse sexual
 relations with white men; and the right of a slave to be free of physical abuse or
 coercion imposed by masters or other quasi officials without due process of law-
 a "right to be exempted from coercion, stripes, and punishment, as long as he
 respects the rights of others."65
 In extending an ethos of nonviolent punishment from state action to private
 relationships, the antislavery movement both drew on and fed the objections to
 the use of corporal punishment that had crescendoed in the antebellum era. The
 use of physical chastisement in prisons and mental hospitals, on naval ships, in
 schoolrooms, and even by parents came under attack by reformers who urged that
 physical punishment be used only as a last resort, and only in moderation. Wife
 abuse rose to visibility as a public problem, with many states expanding the grounds
 for divorce to include cruelty. Even cruelty to animals became less respectable, at
 least among the genteel: several editions of the famous weepy Black Beauty carried
 the subtitle, The "Uncle Tom's Cabin" of the Horse. 66
 What these movements had in common is a rejection not just of cruelty between
 sentient beings, but of cruelty in relationships of power. As Judith Shklar notes,
 cruelty as a vice appeared late on the Western scene, roughly coincident with the
 65 Liberator, March 17, 1837, p. 46; William Hosmer, Slavery and the Church (1853; New York, 1969), 185.
 To contrast eighteenth-century definitions of natural rights, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords
 in American Politics since Independence (New York, 1987), 49-51. On the right to freedom of movement, see
 Liberator, June 6, 1835, p. 89; Jacobus tenBroek, Equal under Law (1951; New York, 1965), 87-88, 125; and
 William Hosmer, The Higher Law in Its Relation to Civil Government (1852; New York, 1969), 88-89. On the
 right to marry, see tenBroek, Equal under Law, 53, 123-25; Channing, "Slavery," 35; Liberator, Oct. 31, 1835,
 p. 173; and ibid., Feb. 13, 1836, p. 25. On the right to refuse sexual relations, see Proceedings of the American
 Anti-Slavery Society At Its Second Decade, 44; Sarah Grimk6, "Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the
 Condition of Woman," in The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimke: Selected Writings, 1835-1839, ed.
 Larry Ceplair (New York, 1989), 207-10; and Proceedings of the Ill. Anti-Slavery Convention Held at Upper
 Alton ... 1837 (Alton, Ill., 1838), 15. Finally, on the right to be free of physical abuse, see Channing, "Slavery,"
 35, 17; Lerner, Grimke Sisters, 114; and tenBroek, Equal under Law, 51-54.
 66 Brodhead, Cultures ofLetters, 13-47; Myra C. Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners,
 Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America (Albany, 1984); Philip Greven, The Protestant Tempera-
 ment: Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early America (New York, 1977), 276-
 81; Gerald N. Grob, Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875 (New York, 1973); Elizabeth Pleck,
 Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present (New
 York, 1987), 34-66; Robert L. Griswold, "Law, Sex, Cruelty, and Divorce in Victorian America, 1840-1900,"
 American Quarterly, 38 (Winter 1986), 721-45; Turner, Reckoning with the Beast; Anna Sewell, Black Beauty:
 The "Uncle Tom's Cabin" of the Horse (Boston, 1894). On the related issue of pacifism in this period, see Lewis
 Perry, Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought (Ithaca, 1973); and
 Peter Brock, Radical Pacifists in Antebellum America (Princeton, 1968).
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 appearance of a newly benevolent God. By the eighteenth century, though, "putting
 cruelty first" among vices became a powerful underpinning of liberal democracy.
 Enlightened opinion set its face decidedly against deliberate infliction of extreme
 490 The Journal of American History September 1995
 punishments by the civil state, as reflected in the constitutional ban on cruel and
 unusual punishments in the United States.67 While the critique of excessive power
 in the state was the signature of eighteenth-century political theory, antebellum
 reformers' trademark was the extension of that critique to "private" status relations,
 including the master-slave, husband-wife, and parent-child pairings, in which the
 common law had invested private citizens with quasi-governmental powers over
 dependent others, such that public and private ordering overlapped substantially.
 Plantation "justice" outraged the same sensibilities that condemned torture, exces-
 sive sentences, and public punishments and executions by the state.68 Bringing
 stories of abuse into public view was an early attempt to rationalize status relation-
 ships and to delegitimize the unbridled personal power of masters over slaves, which
 the party of reform considered barbaric. Individual rights claims posed a critical
 challenge to such power.
 The Civil War and Reconstruction reoriented reformers, away from popular rights
 discourse and toward faith in a legal positivist vision of rights and remedies as secured
 by statute or constitutional amendment. As Elizabeth Cady Stanton suggested in
 1869, "sympathy as a civil agent is vague and powerless until caught and chained
 in logical . . . propositions, and coined into state law." The roots of congressional
 action, though, lay in the earlier period. Scholars point out that early Reconstruction
 legislation, in particular, the Thirteenth Amendment (adopted in 1865), was con-
 ceived in the context of a "vocabulary of freedom" that owed a good deal to aboli-
 tionist efforts.69
 Significantly, the years 1865 and 1866 saw a resurgence of atrocity stories, now
 in the form of official reports from the Freedmen's Bureau and other federal agencies,
 documenting the continuing violence against freed slaves. One two-page segment
 of a much-publicized report by Gen. Carl Schurz, for example, documents shootings
 with bullets and buckshot, drownings, whippings, pursuit by patrols with dogs,
 67 Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 7-44; Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution:
 Capital Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865 (New York, 1989), 50-70; Paul
 M. Spurlin, "Beccaria's Essay on Crimes and Punishments in Eighteenth-Century America," in Studies on Voltaire
 andthe Eighteenth Century, 27 (Geneva, 1963), 1489-1504, esp. 1498-1504; Anthony F. Granucci, "'Nor Cruel
 and Unusual Punishments Inflicted': The Original Meaning," California Law Review, 57 (Oct. 1969), 839-65.
 68 In suggesting that abolitionists should have recognized the brutality of wage labor as an analog to slavery,
 David Brion Davis seriously underestimates the importance of northern repugnance to governance through deliber-
 ately inflicted pain, in contrast to the liberating face of contract, which resonated strongly with the theme of
 voluntarism. See David Brion Davis, "The Preservation of English Liberty, I," in Antislavery Debate, ed. Bender,
 65-103; and William Ellery Channing, "Remarks on the Slavery Question in a Letter toJonathan Philips, Esq.,"
 in Channing, Works, V, 5-106, esp. 37-38.
 69 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Speech to the McFarland-Richardson Protest Meeting," in Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
 Susan B. Anthony: Correspondence, Writings, Speeches, ed. Ellen C. DuBois (New York, 1981), 125-30, esp.
 127; Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, EqualJustice under Law: Constitutional Development, 1835-
 1875 (New York, 1982), 390. See also William E. Nelson, "The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles
 of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America," Harvard Law Review, 87 (Jan. 1974), 513-566; Howard
 Jay Graham, "The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part I," Wisconsin Law Review
 (May 1950), 479-507; HowardJay Graham, "The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment,
 Part II," ibid. (July 1950), 610-61.
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 and hangings, often of multiple victims. These reports, often entered as official
 congressional documents, helped spur Congress to craft legislative or constitutional
 protection for the personal security of freed slaves. 70 While they were often unable to
 protect free Black workers, Freedmen's Bureau agents from the top down identified
 corporal punishment as the incident of slavery most at odds with free status, and
 they issued orders that whipping be abolished as a form of labor discipline. One
 northerner proclaimed, "the day of the lash and corporal punishment is past, and
 must give way to law and moral power."'"
 Congress responded to the ongoing persecution of freed slaves with the Civil
 Rights Act of 1866 and, in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment. Both granted the
 federal government new powers to enforce the citizen's traditional right to state
 protection against private violence. In supporting those acts, many legislators-
 including some who did not advocate the extension of political rights to former
 slaves -clearly intended to secure federal protection for the citizen's right to per-
 sonal safety.72
 In the event, political will flagged, and courts in the nineteenth century failed
 to develop the broad protective potential of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amend-
 ments and the Civil Rights Act: some of the ugliest chapters in the history of
 American racial violence were written after their passage. But the Thirteenth Amend-
 ment and the Civil Rights Act in particular the high-water marks of abolitionist
 sentiment- show clear intent to regulate, not just state action, but violence between
 private individuals bound together by legal status, specifically the systematized
 violence of slavery. The Civil Rights Act, for example, provided sanctions against
 individuals acting in a range of capacities, "under color of law, statute, ordinance,
 regulation, or custom. " Such provisions helped dismantle the common law privileges
 and protections that constituted the master-slave relationship as a system of private
 ordering that virtually excluded the civil law.'
 It is difficult to make larger normative claims for humanitarianism in the wake
 of works like Michel Foucault's brilliant Discipline andPunish. But Foucault's mono-
 lithic focus on forms of state power obscures particular uses of humanitarian rhetoric
 70 U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz on Condition of the South ... 39 Cong., 1 sess.,
 doc. 2, Dec. 19, 1865, 18-19; U.S. Congress, House, Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Report of the Joint
 Committee on Reconstruction, 39 Cong., 1 sess., House Report 30, part iv, March 5, 1866, 82; Edward L. Ayers,
 Vengeance andJustice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South (New York, 1984), 151-
 65; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 119-23, 225.
 71 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Freedmen's Affairs, Report of the Commissioners of the Freedmen's
 Bureau, 39 Cong., 1 sess., doc. 70, March 19, 1866, 147; George Bentley, History of the Freedmen's Bureau
 (New York, 1974), 27; Donald G. Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion: The Freedmen's Bureau and the Legal
 Rights of Blacks, 1865-1868 (Millwood, N.Y., 1979), 90-91; Foner, Reconstruction, 154-57, 165. In Foucaultian
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 Crumbling, 163-82.
 72 Hyman and Wiecek, EqualJustice underLaw, 295-334, 386-438; Foner, Reconstruction, 228-80; tenBroek,
 Equal underLaw, 117-19, 157-239; StevenJ. Heyman, "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and
 the Fourteenth Amendment," Duke Law Journal, 41 (Dec. 1991), 507-71, esp. 545-70.
 73 Hyman and Wiecek, EqualJustice under Law, 437-515, esp. 437, 464; tenBroek, Equal under Law, 203-
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 in struggles against such figures as masters and patriarchs, who in their traditional
 roles were deputized to use violence against their subordinates.74 New attitudes to
 cruelty embodied in social or legal norms did not herald a cessation of violence. But
 to the extent that weaker parties in status relationships could invoke the protection of
 the state -what legal scholars label "calling in the giant" - the new norms had
 redistributed power to benefit the more vulnerable at the expense of their aggressors.
 No judicial system ever excludes violence absolutely, but it does expand or contract
 categories of people who are protected from, or entitled to resort to, violence. The
 nineteenth-century United States saw a marked broadening in "rights" for the
 persons of slaves, women, and children through the piecemeal growth of protections
 at common law and by statute, state or private regulation, and constitutional amend-
 ment. Concepts of the rights of the person put into play during the antebellum
 era helped redraw the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable violence,
 as ultimately reflected in broadened definitions of assault. They contributed much
 to the slow process of the constitutionalization of individual rights that has continued
 into this century.75
 In addition to contributing to changed cultural norms, the rhetoric of sympathy
 for suffering also provided the basis for a now familiar style of legal reasoning, the
 argument for rights by analogy. While Revolution-era rights talk addressed the
 effects of oppressive behavior that harmed all citizens (if not all persons) equally,
 the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social movements has largely been
 the extension of rights to groups discriminated against on the basis of perceived
 differences. One of the most successful arguments in modern constitutional jurispru-
 dence has been "I am like that person and so I deserve the same rights." But for
 that argument to succeed, the rights-bearing public must offer an answering embrace
 to the outsiders and bring them into the fold, even if only for limited purposes.
 Empathic identification - "that person is like me and so she deserves the same
 rights" -is critical to that response.
 Before its arrival on the steps of the Supreme Court, this kind of moral reasoning
 became commonplace in less exalted circles. Pioneered by abolitionists, identifica-
 tion with suffering others was a central theme as well in antislavery sentimental
 fiction, which invoked slaves' sentient experience in a move to bring them within
 the compass of humanity. When one of the Quaker women sheltering the fugitive
 Eliza and George in Uncle Tom's Cabin is commended on her love of neighbor,
 she responds, "Isn't it what we are made for? If I didn't love John and the Baby, I
 should not know how to feel for [Eliza]. "76 Didactic tales, narratives, and sentimental
 74 Whatever Foucault believes about voluntary pain, my own position is that, until invited, not beating people
 is better than beating them. Michel Foucault, Discipline andPunish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
 (New York, 1977).
 75 Andrew Fede, "Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-1865: A Case Study of Law
 and Social Change in Six Southern States," American JournalofLegalHistory, 29 (April 1985), 93-150; Hartog,
 "Constitution of Aspiration." See also n66 above.
 76 For the quotation from Uncle Tom 's Cabin, see Ashworth, "Relationship between Capitalism and Humanitari-
 anism," 197. Chandler, Poetical Works, 23; Fisher, Hard Facts, 98-99.
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 fiction urging white northern audiences to empathize with slaves' plight helped
 shape new moral perceptions of slaves as sentient beings, qualified to become
 rights-bearing individuals.
 On a more cautious note, the widespread imagery of the brutalized slave may
 also have delimited the political will and imagination when it came time to define
 the scope of free Blacks' new "rights" on paper. The repetitious images of slaves'
 degradation may have worked to set them apart as a class in the viewer's mind, to
 constitute difference rather than to obliterate it: certainly freed Blacks themselves
 dropped the suffering stance when it had done its work.77 At the very least, an
 emphasis on the "right" to physical autonomy proved a poor stand-in for a more
 comprehensive vision of social and economic justice: private wrongs beget private
 remedies. The emphasis on relieving the violence of slavery may have "retarded
 the development of a vocabulary that could depict more subtle forms of coercion,
 oppression, and class rule. "78
 Nonetheless, abolitionists used narratives of slave suffering to help bring about
 a change in conventions of moral reasoning that underlay rights claims, specifically in
 conventions about individuals' right to protection from bodily abuse. Humanitarians
 were not always humane, and the career of "rights" has been far more checkered
 than abolitionists could have foretold. But for better and for worse, this strategy
 contributed substantially to the growing power of individual rights within our system
 of jurisprudence.
 77 Andrews, "Representation of Slavery," 62-66. Thanks to Robert Orsi for a very eloquent letter on the
 limitations imposed by the role of the sufferer.
 78 David Brion Davis, "Reflections on Abolitionism and Ideological Hegemony," in Antislavery Debate, ed.
 Bender, 161-79, esp. 176.
